On the Absurdity of the IPv6 “Escape from Scarcity” Narrative
Would anyone move two hours out of the city to save 1% of their rent?
The Notes of Lu Heng
Who gave the Internet’s recordkeepers the power to govern it? These Notes follow that question from everyday analogies to a different design for the network.
All Notes
Follow a question, find a particular Note, or read how the argument develops.
Names, numbers, protocols and decentralized coordination.
11 Notes found
Would anyone move two hours out of the city to save 1% of their rent?
Whose incentives does an infinite address space serve?
Who pays for a “transition” that never ends?
Why does an efficient network care nothing about who you are?
What would a migration have to pay back before real networks adopt it?
What changes when uniqueness is guaranteed by an algorithm instead of an institution?
Today, the Internet’s most fundamental layer—IP address registration—remains centralised in the hands of five private Regional Internet Registries. Each holds a fragment of the global registration database, operates under a single national jurisdiction, and collectively costs hundreds of millions of dollars annually to maintain a system that is, in technical terms, trivial: a registration database measured in hundreds of megabytes. This structure introduces bureaucracy, inefficiency, geopolitical risk, and single points of failure into what has become critical global infrastructure.
Why do state or treaty-based replacements for the registries fail, and what works instead?
As IPv4 exhaustion rendered the original allocation role of Regional Internet Registries obsolete, a recurring question emerged: should RIRs continue to exist, and if so, in what form? Various alternatives have been proposed—state control, intergovernmental bodies, or treaty-based institutions modeled after organizations like the IAEA. All of these proposals share the same flaw: they attempt to solve a simple technical problem by adding political and bureaucratic complexity.
What would it take to move core identifiers out of institutions that predate today’s technology?
The Internet today still relies on legacy structures that allocate and register critical identifiers—names and numbers—through centralised institutions that predate modern decentralised technology. These institutions, known as Regional Internet Registries, were created when the network was small and technical collaboration was informal. As the Internet matured into a global utility, the centralised control of identifiers became a structural vulnerability: a choke point susceptible to power capture, opaque governance and political pressure.
Can a national law contain data that flows everywhere?
Global discussions on data sovereignty often confuse technical ideals with operational realities. At the Interconnect World Forum 2025 in Tokyo, I highlighted a core truth: enforceability of national data localisation laws is limited in a global digital economy where data flows everywhere and no single jurisdiction can physically contain connectivity.
Why is the last centralised layer of the Internet a structural risk, not a philosophical one?
The Internet has been steadily moving toward decentralisation for decades. From infrastructure to applications, from blockchain to Web3, almost every layer is reducing single points of control. Yet one critical layer remains stubbornly centralised: names and numbers—domain names and IP addresses. This is not a philosophical issue but a structural risk. Any centralised choke point can be captured, politicised, or abused, and when that happens, the Internet fragments.
If a registry is only an address book, what does “digital sovereignty” actually control?
The Internet is often discussed as if it were a territory that can be owned, controlled, or conquered. This is a fundamental misunderstanding.